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Services trade reform matters, but what is Doha doing 
about it? It has been hard to judge, because of the 
opaqueness of services policies and the opaqueness of the 
request-offer negotiating process. This paper attempts to 
assess what is on the table. It presents the results of the 
first survey of applied trade policies in the major services 
sectors of 56 industrial and developing countries. These 
policies are then compared with these countries’ Uruguay 
Round commitments in services and the best offers that 
they have made in the current Doha negotiations. The 
paper finds that at this stage, Doha promises greater 
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security of access to markets but not any additional 
liberalization. Uruguay Round commitments are on 
average 2.3 times more restrictive than current policies.  
The best offers submitted so far as part of the Doha 
negotiations improve on Uruguay Round commitments 
by about 13 percent but remain on average 1.9 times 
more restrictive than actual policies. The World Trade 
Organization’s Hong Kong Ministerial had set out 
ambitious goals for services but the analysis here shows 
that much remains to be done to achieve them. 
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  SERVICES IN DOHA:  WHAT’S ON THE TABLE? 
 
In the Doha negotiations, the focus is primarily on agriculture and manufactured goods.  Services 
are mentioned, but more out of a sense of obligation than conviction. This is a puzzle. Some 80 
percent of GDP in the US and the EU originates in services. Together they account for over 60 
percent of world services exports. The business service exports of India, China and Brazil have 
grown by well over 10 percent every year for the last decade, and India may soon export more 
services than goods.   
 
The potential gains from reform of trade in communications, finance, transport and business 
services are large – probably larger than those from comparable liberalization of goods trade.  
Even exploiting the opportunities arising from goods trade liberalization will require better 
services: Sub-Saharan African exporters today pay transport costs many times greater than the 
tariffs they face in industrial country markets.
1 Moreover, without progress in services there 
simply may not be enough on the table to allow progress in other market access areas: services 
are the strongest export interest of WTO members like the EU, India and US that are the focal 
point of efforts to liberalize agricultural trade.  
 
So services matter.  But what is Doha doing about it?  It has been hard to judge, because of the 
opaqueness of services policies and the opaqueness of the request-offer negotiating process.  
This paper tries to assess what is on the table.  It begins by summarizing what we believe is the 
first survey of applied trade policies in the major services sectors of 56 industrial and developing 
countries.  These policies are then compared with these countries’ Uruguay Round commitments 
in services and the best offers that they have made in the current Doha negotiations. 
 
The bottom line:  At this stage, Doha promises somewhat greater security of access to services 
markets but not an iota of liberalization.  Ironically, two of the most protected sectors, transport 
and professional services (involving the international mobility of people), are either not being 
negotiated at all or not with any degree if seriousness.  Uruguay Round commitments are on 
average 2.3 times more restrictive than current policies.  The best offers submitted so far as part 
of the Doha negotiations improve on UR commitments by about 13% but are still on average 1.9 
times more restrictive than actual policies.  At present, Doha offers not greater access to markets 
but a weak assurance that access will not get worse. 
 
Negotiators have been content to let services lag.  The “request-offer” negotiating process has 
resulted in a low-level equilibrium trap. As important, services have not been given the political 
attention their economic significance deserves.  The WTO’s Hong Kong Ministerial had set out 
ambitious goals.  Our analysis shows that those goals are still remote. 
 
Section I of this note describes our survey and the policies on the ground in the countries 
surveyed.  Section II describes how Doha improves on the Uruguay Round, and how far offers 
are from reality.  Section III concludes with unsolicited advice on how we might do better. 
                                                 
1 A recent World Bank book shows that Indian horticultural producers receive on average only one-sixth of the price 
consumers pay because of inefficient storage, transport and distribution. Providing farmers better access to services 
would enhance the economic gains from, and strengthen the political case for, agricultural trade liberalization. 
  2Source of data and methodology 
 
An ongoing research project by the World Bank is compiling data on actual or applied trade 
policies in services. To date surveys have been conducted in 32 developing and transition 
countries and comparable information obtained for 24 OECD countries.  
 
The following sectors were included in the survey: financial services (includes retail banking, 
life and automobile insurance, and reinsurance), telecommunications (includes fixed and 
mobile), retail distribution, transportation (air passenger, road and railway freight, maritime 
international shipping and maritime auxiliary services), and selected professional services.
2  In 
each sector, the survey covers the most relevant modes of supplying that service:  cross border 
trade in services (mode 1 in WTO parlance) in financial, transportation and professional services; 
commercial presence or FDI (mode 3) in each services sector; and the presence of service 
supplying individuals (mode 4) in professional services.   
 
In each of the 32 developing and transition countries, the surveys were completed by local law 
firms which were familiar with the policy regime in the sectors.  For the 24 OECD countries, the 
comparable policy information was collected from various publicly available sources, including 
their GATS commitments and the most recent offers, and other sector specific databases such as 
Economic Intelligence Unit Country Finance reports, IMF Annual Report on Exchange Rate and 
Exchange Arrangements, and the AXCO insurance database. The survey information and the 
OECD policy summaries are confirmed by the government trade officials during 2008. 
Government officials from sixty per cent of the countries covered responded and confirmed the 
accuracy of the policy information.  Some revisions were made to the policy summary after the 
follow up with the governments.
3 The UR commitments and the Doha Offers came from the 
WTO.  
 
To capture the broad restrictiveness of services trade policies and commitments, a summary of 
key restrictions was prepared for each sector-mode. Then, each summary was mapped on a 5-
point scale ranging from 0 (for no restrictions) to 1 (highly restricted)
4, with three intermediate 
levels of restrictiveness (0.25. 0.50 and 0.75) (Annex Table 2).
5  Furthermore, sector results are 
aggregated across modes of supply using weights that reflect judgments of the relative 
importance of the different modes for a sector (Annex Table 3). For example, mode 4 (temporary 
movement of suppliers) is important for professional services, but not for telecommunications, 
where mode 3 is the dominant mode of contesting a market. Sector restrictiveness indices are 
                                                 
2 The survey also covered air transport services, but we do not describe the findings in this paper because air traffic 
rights were excluded from the scope of the GATS.  Maritime auxiliary services cover cargo handling, storage and 
warehousing, customs clearance, container station and depot services, agency, and freight forwarding services. The 
professional services consist of accounting, auditing, and legal advisory services for domestic and international law. 
3 For the list countries that sent the policy confirmation, see annex table 4.  
4 In the quantification of GATS commitments and offers, if a country did not schedule a sector or if it entered 
“Unbound” for a particular mode, the maximum score of 1 is assigned to the relevant modes. 
5 The list of restrictions included in the summary is not exhaustive, but selected to facilitate a comparison with 
restrictions scheduled during the Uruguay Round and the Doha Agenda.  For example, an excessively high fee for 
establishing an international gateway in telecommunications emerges from our survey as a significant impediment to 
entry, but is not treated as a restriction because this measure is not scheduled under the GATS. 
  3aggregated using sector GDP shares as weights
6. Finally, the regional services trade 
restrictiveness indices (STRIs) are the simple averages of the country indices within respective 
regions. 
            
I.  THE STATE OF ACTUAL POLICY IN SERVICES 
 
An evaluation of what Doha offers in services is much harder than in goods.  First, there is no 
database of actual trade policies in specific services sectors – i.e. the counterpart of “applied” 
tariffs.  Second, the Doha negotiations in services are not based on an agreed formula for cuts in 
protection but on offers by each member of market access (and national treatment) in specific 
sectors.  Third, it is hard to quantify services trade policies, which are akin to non-tariff barriers 
and include prohibitions, quotas, and discriminatory regulation.  We describe here efforts to 
overcome these difficulties and construct a picture of what Doha offers in services.  
 
Figures 1 to 4 summarize information on actual policies.  Figure 1 is a scatter diagram where the 
location of each country reflects the overall restrictiveness of its services trade policies and its 
per capita income.  The rich countries are clustered together at the bottom-right showing that 
they are quite open overall (though as we see below, some sectors remain restricted).  There is 
much more variation in the restrictiveness of services policies for low-income countries. Some of 
the poorest countries, like Cambodia, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and Mongolia are remarkably 
open – with World Bank-IMF reform programs and accession to the WTO probably playing a 
significant role.   
 
Interestingly, some of the most restrictive policies today are visible in the fast-growing 
economies of Asia, including China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand, as 
well as in the Middle East, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia.  Figure 2, confirms that in 
terms of regions, the most restrictive policies are observed in MENA and Asian countries.  
Policies are much more liberal in Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe and the OECD 
countries.  
 
The survey reveals that developing countries have significantly liberalized a range of service 
sectors over the last couple of decades, but in some areas protection persists (Figure 3).  In fact, 
the overall pattern of policies across sectors is increasingly similar in developing and industrial 
countries. In telecommunications, public monopolies seem in most countries a relic of history, 
with at least some measure of competition introduced in both mobile and fixed services. In 
banking too, domination by state-owned banks has given way to increased openness to the 
presence of foreign and private banks. Very few countries restrict foreign investment in retail. 
However, even though the markets for these services are now more competitive, they are in most 
countries some distance from being truly contestable. In telecommunications, governments 
continue to limit the number of providers and, particularly in Asia, the extent of foreign 
ownership. In both banking and insurance, the allocation of new licenses remains opaque and 
highly discretionary.  In retail, a range of domestic regulations, such as zoning laws and single 
brand retailing, severely impede entry in both developing and industrial countries. 
                                                 
6 The same sector shares are used for all countries for comparability. 
  4 
Transport and professional services remain a bastion of protectionism in high-income countries 
and are also subject to high barriers in developing countries.  In maritime transport, even though 
international shipping is today quite open, entry into cabotage and auxiliary services such as 
cargo handling is in many countries restricted.  In professional services, even though there is 
increased scope for international trade through electronic means, there remain restrictions on 
foreign presence, particularly of individual service providers. In general, accounting and the 
practice of international law tend to be more open than auditing and the practice of domestic law.  
In the sectors and modes covered here, the restrictions on foreign investment are generally less 
stringent than the restrictions on cross-border trade, and far less stringent than the presence of 
foreign professionals (Figure 4). 
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Note 1: There are in total 56 countries, of which 32 are developing and 24 are OECD countries and the following 
sectors are covered: financial, telecommunications, retailing, maritime, air passenger transport 
7, and professional 
services.  
 
                                                 
7 For air transport, the policy information for mode 1 (BASA) came from the QUASAR database of the WTO.  
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Note: World represents the simple average STRI of 56 countries 
 
 
Figure 3: Restrictiveness of services trade policies by region and sector 
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Note: Financial services include banking and life and non-life insurance and reinsurance, telecommunications 
include fixed and mobile telecom, transportation includes air passenger, maritime shipping, and auxiliary services, 
and professional services include accounting, auditing, and legal services. 
 
  6Figure 4: Restrictiveness of services trade policies by mode 
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Note: Mode 1 includes financial, air passenger, maritime shipping and professional, mode 3 includes financial, 
telecommunications, retailing, air passenger and maritime shipping, maritime auxiliary, and professional, mode 4 
includes accounting, auditing, and legal services.   
 
 
II.  WHAT DOES DOHA OFFER? 
 
Most services liberalization all around the world has so far been undertaken unilaterally.  
Multilateral negotiations on services began in the Uruguay Round. These negotiations reduced 
policy uncertainty by inducing countries to begin to lock-in unilateral liberalization, but the 
negotiations  produced little additional market-opening (Hoekman, 2006).  The same is true for 
most regional agreements on services, with a few exceptions.  
 
What is currently on the table in Doha?  Consider first what is not. Doha offers as they stand 
today do not offer any liberalization of actual policy in the sectors and modes of supply 
examined here.  Ironically, two of the currently most protected sectors, transport and professional 
services, are either not being negotiated at all or not with any degree of seriousness.  The Annex 
to the GATS on Air Transport Services excludes from the scope of the GATS all measures 
affecting air traffic rights and services directly related to the exercise of air traffic rights.  The 
maritime negotiations are notionally on (with offers from some countries) but have never really 
got off the ground because the United States is unwilling to accept GATS disciplines 
(particularly the MFN principle) on maritime transport and has not made any commitments or 
offers in this area.   As far as professional services are concerned, a vital mode of supply, the 
presence of natural persons, faces almost insurmountable barriers in most countries because trade 
negotiators have had little liberalizing influence on immigration policy and domestic regulations 
such as licensing and qualification requirements.  
  7 
Given that liberalization is not on the table, the question is whether the current Doha offers 
involve any greater security of access than the Uruguay Round (UR) commitments under the 
GATS. What has so far been accomplished in this respect can be assessed by comparing actual 
policy with UR Commitments and the offers submitted so far as part of the Doha negotiations. 
 
Of the 56 countries surveyed, Russia was excluded from the comparative analysis because it is 
not yet a WTO member.  Of the remaining countries, 45 submitted Doha Round Offers, 7 
(Ecuador, Ghana, Mongolia, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, and Venezuela) have not submitted 
offers and 3 (Cambodia, Saudi Arabia, and Ukraine) have recently submitted Accession 
Schedules. For these latter ten countries, as well as for other countries which did not improve 
their UR commitments, the scores assigned for the offers are the same as those for the UR 
commitments.  For each country, there are 26 sector-modes
8 (that is a specific mode of supply in 
a specific sector) for which the actual policies are compared with the UR commitments and Doha 
Offers. Of the maximum possible number of sector-modes (26x55), countries did not make any 
commitments or entered “unbound” in 36 per cent of sector-modes.   In 85 per cent of the sector-
modes, Doha Offers do not improve the UR commitments.  
 
As Figures 5, 6 and 7 show, in all regions of the world, actual policy is substantially more liberal 
than the UR commitments.  Uruguay Round commitments are on average 2.3 times more 
restrictive than current policies (Table 1; Annex Tables 1 and 3), in other words, the binding gap 
(UR commitment minus actual policies) remains on average 130 per cent more restrictive than 
the policies. As Figure 5 shows, the poorer countries have on average bigger binding gaps 
between commitments and actual policy.  
 
Doha offers improve on the UR commitments, but the Offer gap between offers and actual policy 
is large.  Doha offers are on average 1.9 times more restrictive than the actual policies (Table 1; 
Annex Tables 2 and 3), meaning the Offer gap (Doha Offers minus actual policies) remains on 
average 99 per cent more restrictive than the policies.  Interestingly, as Figure 6 shows, the 
absolute improvement in offers is on average the same at all levels of income. At present, Doha 
does not offer much liberalization, rather some reassurance that access will not get worse.  
 
                                                 
8 For the list of 26 sector-modes, please see annex table 3. The survey covered road and rail freight in mode 3 and air 
freight and air passengers in mode 1 and mode 3.  The latter were, however, excluded from the comparative 
analysis.   
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At the regional level: 
 
-African countries have actual policies that are significantly more liberal than their UR 
commitments, and comparable to those of OECD countries.  Four of the six African countries 
considered here (Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, and Tanzania) did not submit Doha offers. The offers 
of the other two countries, Kenya and South Africa, did not make a significant improvement over 
their UR commitments in the sectors covered in this survey.  During the Uruguay round, most 
low-income countries did not schedule commitments in their major sectors. For example, 
Tanzania scheduled only the tourism sector.   
 
-Eastern European countries have actual policies, UR commitments, and Doha offers that are 
much more liberal than those of the other regions. The gap between their commitments and 
policies, and the gap between their offers and policies is not large. This is because the initial 
commitments of the ECA countries were quite liberal and ambitious (see for example the 
accession schedule of Ukraine). In the Doha Round, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and 
Lithuania did not make independent offers, but were covered by the offer of the European 
Community (EC).      
 
-The OECD countries and those in the LAC region have actual policies which are more liberal 
than their Uruguay Round commitments.  Their Doha offers improve somewhat on their UR 
commitments and narrow the gap with actual policies. The offer gap in the LAC region remains 
very large, while the offer gap is small for the OECD.   
 
  9-Countries belonging to South Asia (SAR) have the most restrictive policies and the UR 
commitments. However, the offers made by the region significantly improve on the 
commitments. Compared to the other non-OECD partners, countries in SAR have made greater 
improvements in Doha.  
 
-Countries in EAP and MENA offered little in the Doha Round. Their applied policies are 
restrictive and their offer gap is smaller.  
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Offer Improvement (Uruguay Round commitment-Doha Offer)
Offer gap(Doha Offer-Actual policy)
 Actual Policy
 
Note: Where a country did not make a Doha offer, the sector index reflects the Uruguay round commitments.   
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At the sector level: 
 
-Financial and telecommunications services are relatively open, and the Doha offers have 
significantly improved on the Uruguay Round commitments but still do not reflect actual policy. 
 
-Policies in retailing are quite open. Offers do not improve significantly on the UR commitments 
and the gap between Doha Offers and the actual policies remains one of the largest.  
 
-In maritime transport, there is a huge gap between UR commitments (or the lack of them) and 
actual policy, which Doha offers have narrowed but only by about half. Most improvements 
were made in the maritime auxiliary services and cross-border maritime shipping, offered for 
example by the EC Member States. Most OECD countries kept the status of “unbound” in 
maritime transport through mode 3. From the OECD, only the US did not make any 
improvement in maritime transport.  
 
-In professional services, actual policies are highly restrictive (especially for the presence of 
natural persons), and Doha offers have narrowed the gap between UR commitments and actual 
policy. Since both actual policies and the Doha Offers are restrictive, the gap between Doha 
Offers and policies is small.  
 
There is a reasonable prospect that offers will be improved.  The latest report on the status of the 
services negotiations (WTO, 2008) noted that further discussion was needed on issues relating to 
participants' level of ambition, their willingness to bind existing and improved levels of market 
access and national treatment, as well as specific reference to Modes 1 and 4 with respect to the 
treatment of sectors and modes of supply of export interest to developing countries. The chair of 
the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) also held a “signaling exercise” among a group of 
ministers, at the time that “modalities” in agriculture and non-agricultural market access 
  11(NAMA) were being discussed. At the signaling exercise, participating ministers indicated that 
they might significantly improve their services offers.   
 


























SAR (3)  36.0  15.5 18% 32.3 90% 47.8 133%
EAP (7)  36.8  1.7 3% 24.3 66% 26.0 71%
MENA 
(5)  36.9 3.8 7% 17.4 47% 21.2 57%
AFR (6)  16.9  0.7 1% 52.9 314% 53.6 318%
LAC (9)  16.6  6.3 10% 41.9 253% 48.2 290%
OECD 
(20) 14.9 9.4 46% 3.8 25% 13.1 88%
ECA (5)  10.6  5.4 19% 4.4 41% 9.8 93%
World 
(55)  21.0 6.4 13% 20.8 99% 27.2 130%
Note:  The numbers in bracket indicate the number of countries covered per region. See annex table 4 for the list of 





Our analysis suggests that negotiators have been content to let services lag. The best market 
access offers do not even reflect the liberalization that has already taken place. The “request-
offer” negotiating process, bilateral and plurilateral, seems to have resulted in a low-level 
equilibrium trap.  
 
More effort to liberalize trade and investment in services at the multilateral level is needed. 
Perhaps greater progress could be made by turning the negotiating progress on its head, and 
instead of the incremental and unproductive request and offer process, Members could strive 
directly to define a final package.  To be both worthwhile and attainable, such a “package” on 
services would have to be balanced from a mercantilist perspective, commercially relevant from 
a business perspective, and offer substance rather than rhetoric from a development perspective 
(Mattoo, 2005).   Indeed, the WTO’s Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration sketched out similar 
ambitious aims.  An agreement could follow the precedent of the WTO’s Information 
Technology Agreement, where participation is limited to a “critical mass” of signatories who 
would extend the benefits also to non-participants. 
 
Such a package could have three elements. First, a promise not to impose new restrictions on 
trade in services. This would dispel the specter of protectionism that hangs over outsourcing of 
business services – which is producing huge cost savings in the North and ever-widening export 
opportunities for the South. 
 
  12Second, a commitment to eliminate barriers to foreign direct investment, either immediately or, 
in sectors where regulatory inadequacies need to be remedied, in a phased manner.  The greatest 
benefits of securing openness to FDI, especially in infrastructure services, would accrue to the 
South while offering increased business opportunities to the North.   
 
Third, agreement to allow somewhat greater freedom of international movement for individual 
service providers (mode 4 in WTO parlance) in order to fulfill specific services contracts. 
Research shows large potential benefits to both the North and the South from the liberalization of 
mode 4, as it offers a way to realize the gains from trade while averting social and political costs 
in host countries and brain drain losses for source countries. Progress on mode 4 is critical to 
overall balance. 
 
For there to be a reasonable prospect of achieving these goals, more attention needs to be given 
to the regulatory context in which services liberalization takes place.   
 
First, negotiators could focus primarily on securing “national treatment”, i.e. ending all 
discrimination on the entry and operation of foreign services providers, rather than on creating 
more intrusive disciplines. This will reassure regulators that multilateral commitments deprive 
them only of the freedom to discriminate, and not limit their freedom to regulate in any other 
way or adopt policies that improve sector performance.   
 
Second, the development and trade community need to work together to establish a credible 
mechanism to provide regulatory assistance to support liberalization commitments by developing 
countries. This will reassure developing country policymakers that regulatory inadequacies that 
could undermine the benefits of liberalization will be remedied before any market-opening 
commitments take effect.  
 
Third, it should be possible to make temporary entry of foreign services providers conditional on 
the fulfillment of specific conditions by source countries. Immigration authorities in host 
economies need to be assured that source countries will cooperate to screen services providers, to 
accept and facilitate their return, and to combat illegal migration. 
 
The gains from properly managed liberalization of services trade are substantial. World Bank 
analysis has shown this to be the case even in very poor countries. An ambitious package in 
services may provide new dynamism to multilateral trade cooperation. Doing so may also allow 
the Doha Development Agenda to live up to its name. 
  13  14
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Annex Table 1:   
 
Restrictiveness of actual policies       
region Financial  Telecom  Retail  Maritime  Professional  Overall 
SAR 24.3  25.0 33.3 33.3 58.3  36.0
EAP 32.7  32.1 25.0 34.8 58.8  36.8
MENA 38.0  10.0 25.0 28.8 64.0  36.9
AFR 7.4  16.7 4.2 4.4 46.5  16.9
LAC 12.6  5.6 2.8 12.8 44.0  16.6
OECD 3.2  9.4 8.8 8.0 41.0  14.9
ECA 4.7  0.0 0.0 7.5 37.3  10.6
World 13.4  12.5 11.4 14.9 47.0  21.0
            
Restrictiveness of DOHA Offers         
region Financial  Telecom  Retail  Maritime  Professional  Overall 
SAR 48.4  33.3 83.3 79.6 86.7  68.3
EAP 40.3  57.1 75.0 49.8 74.3  61.1
MENA 37.6  25.0 60.0 55.0 80.5  54.3
AFR 33.4  68.8 83.3 88.8 91.7  69.8
LAC 60.5  30.6 55.6 80.4 65.7  58.5
OECD 13.3  9.4 8.8 19.6 41.3  18.7
ECA 14.4  10.0 0.0 12.5 37.8  15.0
World 30.9  28.2 40.9 48.0 60.7  41.8
            
Restrictiveness of UR commitments       
region Financial  Telecom  Retail  Maritime  Professional  Overall 
SAR 67.4  37.5 100.0 100.0 100.0  83.7
EAP 40.3  57.1 78.6 56.9 75.7  62.8
MENA 37.6  27.5 70.0 65.0 80.5  58.1
AFR 33.5  70.8 83.3 88.8 93.3  70.4
LAC 61.9  38.9 61.1 95.8 75.4  64.8
OECD 13.5  9.4 15.0 84.9 56.1  28.1
ECA 18.7  10.0 0.0 64.2 47.3  20.5
World 32.6  30.2 46.4 81.8 69.6  48.2
 Note 1: Completely open=0; completely closed=100 
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Policy  UR commitments  
and Doha Offers 
0  Open without restrictions  None 
0.25  Virtually open (i.e. only 
notification required.) 
 
Open with minor restrictions (i.e. some 
restrictions have been phased in) 
0.5  Some restrictions (i.e. limits on 
foreign equity participation and/or 
legal form of entry)  
 
Open with some restrictions (i.e. with more 
liberal commitments in the future) 
0.75  Virtually closed (i.e. if obtaining 
loan from abroad requires proof 
of domestic unavailability of 
services or services allowed only 
to EU member countries) 
 
Virtually closed (i.e. the supply of services 
reserved to one or two exclusive 
monopolies) 
1.0  Completely closed  Unbound or No commitment (no legal 
binding).  
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Aggregate sectors  
 




weights  Standardized 





Weights scaled for 
sectors covered  
(55 countries) 
Mode 1:  
   (1) Deposit
10 







   (3) Retail banking  0.85 
6 18 
Mode 1: 
  (4) Life 
  (5) Auto 







   (7) Life 
   (8) Auto 
0.90 
4 12 
3  Retailing  Mode 3: 






 (10) Fixed 
 (11) Mobile 
1.0 4  12 
Mode 1: 








services  Mode 3: 
 (13) International 
shipping 
 (14) Auxiliary 
0.30 
2 6 
Mode 1:  
(15) Accounting 
(16) Auditing 
(17) Domestic law  
(18) International law 
0.2 
Mode 3:  
(19) Accounting 
(20) Auditing 
(21) Domestic law  








Mode 4:  
(23) Accounting 
(24) Auditing 
(25)  Domestic law  
(26) International law 
0.4 
8 24 




                                                 
9  Hoekman 1995 
10 To aggregate the sub-sectors for a particular sector such as the indices for fixed and mobile telecom 
services, the simple averages were used.     Annex table 4: Country list and government comments  
 
Surveys conducted in 2007  
for 32 countries 
Government confirmation received in 
2008    
Information collected from public sources in 2007 
for 24 countries 
Government confirmation received 
in 2008 
AFRICA (AFR)     ECA    
Ghana no    Czech  Republic  Yes 
Kenya no    Hungary  no 
Nigeria no    Lithuania  Yes 
Senegal no    Poland  Yes 
South Africa  no    OECD    
Tanzania no    Australia  Yes 
East Asia and Pacific (EAP)     Austria  Yes 
Cambodia no    Belgium  Yes 
China Yes    Canada  no 
Indonesia no    Denmark  Yes 
Malaysia Yes    Finland  Yes 
Mongolia Yes    France  Yes 
Philippines no    Germany  Yes 
Thailand Yes    Greece  Yes 
South Asia region (SAR)     Ireland  Yes 
India no    Italy  no 
Pakistan yes    Japan  Yes 
Sri Lanka  no    Korea, Republic  Yes 
Eastern and Central Europe (ECA)     Netherlands  Yes 
Russia Yes    New  Zealand Yes 
Ukraine no    Portugal  Yes 
Latin America and Caribbean (LAC)   Spain  Yes 
Argentina no    Sweden  Yes 
Brazil Yes    United  Kingdom  Yes 
Chile Yes    United  States  Yes 
Colombia no         
Ecuador no      
Mexico Yes         
Peru Yes         
Trinidad and Tobago  Yes        
Venezuela no        
Middle East and North Africa (MENA)        
Egypt Yes         
Jordan no         
Morocco no         
Saudi Arabia  no        
Tunisia  Yes          
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